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Two forces are about to create a growing market for Individual Annuities in the U. S. and 
Canada. 
 
First, the Post War Baby Boom (born 1946 to 1964) is inexorably moving into retirement.  
Second, there is a strong move away from Employer-sponsored Defined Benefit pension 
plans to Defined Contribution pension plans.  This trend could even extend (in the U.S.) 
into the provision of Social Security benefits. 
 
Under these arrangements, participants must find a way to mitigate their “longevity” risk 
(and the investment risk, although this is not the topic of this paper).  The most obvious 
answer is to buy a life annuity.  However, at this time in the U. S. and Canada, persons 
who voluntarily apply to buy a life annuity are generally assumed to be in extremely 
good health and annuity rates are determined using very low mortality assumptions (high 
life expectancy assumptions).  While there is a growing market in “Enhanced/Impaired 
Annuities”, especially in the U.K., the present pricing structure for annuities in the U. S. 
and Canada means that a large proportion of the population cannot get a “fair value” 
annuity given their less-than-preferred health profile. 
 
This paper looks at reasons for this market reality in the U. S. and Canada.  It also 
reviews the underwriting and marketing of life annuities in the United Kingdom where 
“enhanced” life annuities are available for a broader cross-section of the marketplace. 
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Deux forces sont sur le point de générer une expansion du marché des Rentes Viagères aux 
États-Unis et au Canada. 
 
D’abord, la première cohorte de  baby-boomers (nés entre 1946 et 1964) arrive inévitablement à 
l’âge de la retraite. Ensuite, la tendance des employeurs à remplacer leurs régimes de retraite à 
prestations déterminées par des régimes de retraite à cotisations déterminées. Cette tendance 
pourrait même s’étendre (aux États-Unis) aux prestations de la sécurité sociale. 
 
Entant donné ces nouveaux arrangements, les participants doivent trouver un moyen d'atténuer 
les risques liés à la hausse de leur «longévité» (et les risques liés à l'investissement, bien que ce 
ne soit pas la question abordée dans cette article). La réponse la plus évidente consisterait à 
acheter une rente viagère. Toutefois, les personnes qui aujourd’hui souscrivent volontairement à 
l’achat d’une rente viagère aux États-Unis et au Canada sont généralement supposés être en très 
bon état de santé de telle sorte que les taux de rente sont calculés en faisant l’hypothèse d’un très 
faible taux de mortalité  (d'une espérance de vie élevée). Bien qu'il existe un marché en 
expansion de rentes viagères modifiées, en particulier au Royaume-Uni, la structure de prix 
actuellement en vigueur pour ces rentes aux États-Unis et au Canada signifie qu'une proportion 
importante de la population n’est présentement pas en mesure obtenir une rente reflétant sa 
«juste valeur» marchante en raison de leur profil de santé défavorable. 
 
Cet article examine les raisons derrière cette réalité du marché aux États-Unis et au Canada. Il 
examine également la souscription et la commercialisation des rentes viagères au Royaume-Uni 
où les rentes viagères modifiées sont disponibles pour un plus large segment du marché. 
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I  Introduction 
 
Two important forces are about to impact on the Individual Annuity marketplace. 
 
First, the Post War Baby-boom is reaching its retirement years.  If you accept that the 
Baby-boom was born in the years 1946 to 1964, then the first wave of the Baby-boom 
turned 60 in 2006.  Thus, over the next 20 years, one of the largest well-defined 
demographic groups will be entering retirement. 
 
Second, and at the same time, many Pension Plan Sponsors are moving away from 
Defined Benefit Pension Plans and replacing these systems with Defined Contribution 
Pension Plans.  Statistics tell us that in 1960, traditional Defined Benefit Pension Plans 
covered about half of all private-sector workers in the U.S.  By 2005, only 21 percent of 
private-sector workers participated in a traditional Defined Benefit Pension Plan even 
though about half of all American private-sector workers were still covered by a 
retirement plan.  Defined Contribution plans now overwhelmingly dominate employer-
sponsored retirement programs in the U.S. (EBRI, 2006). 
 
We also see continued pressure to move the U.S. Social Security system (OASDI) from a 
Defined Benefit system to a Defined Contribution system using Individual Accounts. 
 
One implication of the move to Defined Contribution Retirement Savings plans is that the 
“longevity” risk (or the Life Expectancy risk) has to be borne by the individual 
worker/participant.  There is also an investment risk to be transferred or managed, but 
this is not the topic covered by this paper.  The easiest way to mitigate the longevity risk 
is for the worker to buy a Life Annuity from an insurance company at some appropriate 
moment in retirement (for more on the optimal time to annuitize, see:  Milevsky (2001)). 
 
Annuity prices have also increased markedly over the past decade as interest rates have 
dropped and life expectancy has improved thus making life annuities a relatively 
“expensive” product to the consumer.  However, the average cost of annuities is 
tangential to the focus of this paper. 
 
In the life annuity market, there is a growing offering of what we will call “Enhanced” or 
“Impaired” annuities.  In the U.S. and Canada, these are offered to individuals who can 
prove that they are in substandard health.  The applicant does this by submitting a 
medical certificate proving their impaired health.  While this market started a decade ago 
with smoker/non-smoker annuities, it now encompasses a much broader proportion of the 
population. 
 
Some interesting side stories came through to one of the authors in the writing of this 
paper.  In the U.S. and Canada the annuity applicant must supply the insurance company 
with “proof” of his or her substandard health.  This can be expensive for the applicant in 
both dollars and time.  Some applicants actually apply for Life Insurance policies wherein 
the Life Company pays for a medical examination.  They then use this medical certificate 
to apply for their Life Annuity!!   3
 
To date, in the U.S. and Canada, the only basis for issuing an “Enhanced/Impaired” 
annuity is a “Medical” reason substantiated by the applicant. 
 
No substandard prices are being given for workers because of any of the following 
factors:  lifetime occupation, income, education, residential location, etc.  
 
This means that, at the moment, it is still extremely difficult for many workers facing 
retirement to purchase an annuity that fairly reflects the mortality risk being insured.   
That is, the Annuity Insurance industry is apparently not willing to provide competitive 
products to a large proportion of the population who may be looking for a way to mitigate 
the “longevity” risk that they face in retirement. 
 
Why has this occurred and what might be done about it? 
 
II  The Level of Risk Classification in the U.S. and Canadian Life Annuity 
Marketplace, 2006 
 
Defining “risk classes”, each of which pays a different price for insurance, is a long-
standing actuarial principle.  We do this in Life Insurance.  We do this for virtually all 
Property-Casualty products (e.g., young males pay more for Auto insurance than do 
young females or mature males). 
 
Can we determine risk classes for Life Annuities in which each risk class would face a 
premium commensurate with the risk that that class brings to the risk pool? 
 
The first-order response is yes. 
 
In a recent paper, Brown and McDaid (2003) found twelve variables that were significant 
in the analysis of post-retirement mortality.  The twelve variables were (in alphabetical 
order):  Age, Alcohol, Education, Gender, Health Behavior (lifestyle and use of health 
services), Income, Marital Status, Obesity, Occupation, Race and Ethnicity, Religion 
(participation) and Smoking. 
 
Today, the U.S./Canada Life Annuity industry uses the variables of age and gender in 
setting all annuity rates.  With a medical certificate, prices will also be “rated” for 
medical reasons. 
 
While the list of twelve factors is not meant to be exhaustive, Brown and McDaid state 
that all twelve factors are important enough to be included in any actuarial risk 
classification modeling to the extent that data are available for the named applicant.  One 
must remember that many of these factors have strong cross correlations (e.g. education 
and income).  Brown and McDaid point out that, as a general rule, the larger the number 
of risk factors used in one’s model, the less significant are the effects of any omitted 
variables and the greater the likelihood that the assumption of independence of the 
omitted variables would be a reasonable approximation to reality.   4
 
It is the position of this paper that some of the risk variables listed by Brown and McDaid 
should be considered in the underwriting and pricing of life annuities.  In particular, the 
variables of education, income and occupation should be considered. 
 
For some variables, the mortality profile of the preferred risks (e.g. high education, high 
income) is less than 50% of the mortality of the impaired risks (e.g. low education, low 
income).  If we assume an interest rate of 5% per annum, the following table shows the 




Percentage Increase in Annuity Payout 
Increase in qx   Age  65   Age  75   Age  85 
+  25%     +  7%    +11%    +15% 
+    50    +13   +21   +30 
+100    +24   +40   +58 
 
Source:  Brown and McDaid (2003), p25 
 
It is the position of this paper that, in a competitive annuity market, enhanced/impaired 
annuities should be offered to a much wider proportion of the population.  In fact, this 
represents an opportunity for some insurers to carve out a profitable, sizeable niche at the 
expense of their competitors.  New players could do this without threatening any turnover 
of their existing book of business. 
 
In the Brown/McDaid summaries, education, income and occupation showed up as being 
important variables in predicting mortality post-retirement. 
 
As to “Education”, Vaillant and Mukamal (2001) found that it was one of the most 
important predictors of mortality.  Deaton and Paxson (1999) show that at the individual 
level, both income and education are separately protective against mortality.  Rogers et al 
(1999) also suggest that education may be a good underwriting variable since it can 
generally be determined early in life and thus can be assessed for all individuals.  They 
also state that not only does education affect mortality through its link to employment, 
income generation and information gathering, it also affects mortality by influencing 
health behavior and the use of health services.  Bucher and Ragland (1995) found that 
those with less education had higher risk factors.  This was confirmed by Lantz et al 
(1998) who found that smoking, alcohol consumption, sedentary lifestyle and relative 
body weight all varied significantly by educational attainment. 
 
Reviewing “Income” as a potential risk classification variable, several papers noted the 
strong correlation between income levels and life expectancy (see Knox and Tomlin 
(1997), Kallan (1997), Montgomery and Pappas (1996), Rogers et al (1999), Pappas et al 
(1993)).  It has been argued that, rather than income affecting health, health may impact 
on income.  However, Deaton and Paxson (1999) show that only some of the effect of   5
income is removed when allowing for reverse causality.  Wolfson et al (1990) agree.  It is 
true, however, that the income effect decreases with age (especially after age 65).  Again, 
income is also negatively correlated with risky behavior.  Those with the lowest income 
were significantly more likely to smoke, be overweight and be in the lowest quintile for 
physical activity (Lantz et al (1998)). 
 
Other empirical evidence supports the use of “income” as an underwriting variable.  A 
Canada Pension Plan Mortality Study (Office of the Chief Actuary, 2003) analyzed the 
mortality of recipients of Canada Pension Plan retirement income by quartile (i.e., 0-25% 
of a full pension up to 75-100% of a full pension).  Each level of income had significantly 
and measurably lower mortality.  In fact, at ages up to 64 for males and 60 for females, 
the mortality rates of the highest income level were less than half of those of the lowest 
income level.  These mortality differentials decreased with age.  At age 65, Life 
Expectancy for males in the highest income level was 16.43 years while for those in the 
lowest income level it was 14.25 years.  For females aged 65 the comparable Life 
Expectancies were 20.69 and 19.53 respectively. 
 
In a more recent study of Old Age Security data (Office of the Chief Actuary, 2006), data 
were subdivided by income levels showing a low-income group who qualified for the 
Guaranteed Income Supplement (a welfare benefit dependent on low income) up to a 
high-income group who did not receive all of their Old Age Security because of the claw-
back of this benefit for high-income Canadians.  For both males and females, the 
mortality rates for the low-income group were more than twice that of the high-income 
group even up to age 74. 
 
This is very significant in the eyes of the authors.  These are benefit values that can be 
obtained from the Canadian Revenue Agency from the applicant’s tax return.  If buying 
an annuity is voluntary and being “rated” requires the submission of such data at the will 
of the applicant, it would seem that such underwriting should be possible. 
 
Finally, we review the papers on “Occupation”.  Lee (1995) and Sorlie (1995) found that 
employment status showed the largest correlation with mortality.  They suggested this 
relationship could be due to both economic and health factors.  Just being consistently 
employed can be used as an indicator of lower mortality (Williams and Collins (1995)).  
Occupation influences mortality through income, health insurance, camaraderie, lifestyle 
and living environment (Statistical Bulletin (1975).  The effect of occupation also lessens 
with age (Brown (1997)). 
 
Why are we not seeing more Risk Classification in the Annuity marketplace?  One reason 
that industry sources indicate is that this is not a very competitive pricing market because 
of the extra cost of underwriting substandard annuities.  Another reason is that Insurance 
Companies must carry standard annuity reserves for substandard lives unless the 
annuitant is expected to have at least 25% extra mortality, adding to the cost of offering 
enhanced annuities at a lower price to higher mortality risks. 
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Several factors may affect the demand for annuities.  High-income individuals are able to 
self-insure their retirement income through personal wealth.  These high-income 
individuals are ones who might purchase large annuities, producing higher commission 
for annuity brokers.  On the other hand, mid-income individuals are harder to identify and 
target for annuity sales.  They likely lack the personal expertise to evaluate and compare 
annuity products and they would benefit from the assistance of a broker.  A general 
expansion of the annuity market through more sophisticated underwriting can help attract 
additional buyers into the market and provide a large enough sales base to generate an 
attractive level of commission to brokers. 
 
III   The Level of Risk Classification in the U.K. Life Annuity Marketplace, 2006 
 
Given that, until April 2006, U.K. legislation mandated annuitization of tax-advantaged 
savings by age 75, there has been a growing and sophisticated “enhanced/impaired 
annuity” market.  The authors believe the increased market demand for annuities 
encouraged insurers to create attractive products to gain a larger share of the annuity 
purchase market. 
 
The first “enhanced annuities” were issued to smokers starting in 1995.  Since then risk 
classification has developed further to include occupation, postal code and medical 
conditions such as asthma, diabetes, through to more serious conditions such as many 
types of cancer.  Those who have combinations of conditions will face even lower 
premiums.  For example, a male aged 65 with high blood pressure and high cholesterol 
may be able to get £7,772 a year from a fund of £100,000, but if he is also obese this 
would increase to £8,528 (£756 more a year, or almost 10% extra).  A male who has had 
a triple heart bypass in the last 12 months would get £8,034 (Money Management, 2005). 
 
A male who is suffering from cancer and has received chemotherapy could get an 
impaired life annuity of £17,956 (ibid). 
 
Similarly, those with low retirement incomes have mortality rates 40% to 90% higher 
than those with high retirement incomes.  Chris Daykin of the Government Actuary’s 
Department has pointed out that the mortality of those receiving pensions from life 
offices is lower than general population mortality. 
 
The Annuity marketplace in the U.K. can be subdivided into three sectors. 
 
1. Enhanced Annuities which are priced allowing for mild medical conditions and 
lifestyle factors.  Typical rating factors include:  postal code, occupation and smoking 
habits.  Underwriting relies on evidence collected on an insurer’s health questionnaire. 
 
2. Impaired Annuities which are priced allowing for individual medical history based on 
a medical health questionnaire.  For more severe impairments, a doctor’s report is 
generally required in addition to the health questionnaire.  These policies include 
applicants with a history of heart attack(s), cancer and stroke(s).  It must be noted, 
however, that the time-delay factor in this process lessens the market for the annuity   7
product if the applicant is at risk of losing investment income in the interim.  The loss of 
investment income can be avoided for if annuity payments for an immediate annuity 
commence retroactively to the date of application or the annuity premium is refunded 
with at least minimal interest if the annuity is not issued. 
  
3. Immediate Care Annuities which are sold to people in long term care for the elderly.  
Underwriting usually uses measures of Activities of Daily Living (ADLs), which are 
common measures of a person’s ability to live independently.  Otherwise, underwriting 
relies on a doctor’s report for evidence of frailty.   
 
It is estimated that 40% of the U.K. population could qualify for an enhanced or impaired 
annuity.  This is despite the fact that today, only about 10% of annuities are enhanced.  
The authors are not aware of any research into the difference, but it may be a reluctance 
to admit lower than average life expectancy. 
 
Enhanced/impaired annuities met a market that had become disappointed with ever-
decreasing annuity income per dollar of premium because of decreasing interest rates 
combined with increasing life expectancy. 
 
Enhanced/impaired annuities have found demand in two separate market niches.  They 
have increased incomes for those who retire with profiles of high mortality (e.g. those in 
poor health).  It has also worked to provide annuities to fund nursing home care and other 
long term care costs for ill or frail elderly people who are near the end of their lives.  
 
In the U.K., risk classification in annuity pricing has created new rates for classes that 
include:  smokers, those with medical impairments (diabetics, high blood pressure, high 
cholesterol, stroke or heart attack victims), the overweight, and, more recently, manual 
workers living in geographic areas displaying higher than average mortality.  As to the 
latter risk classification, it has been reported that the average life expectancy for a male in 
North Devon was 81 years compared to just under 70 years in Manchester (Money 
Management, 2005). 
 
The underwriting has become more and more sophisticated and has expanded into the 
field of medical and lifestyle conditions. 
 
IV  Lessons from Property/Casualty Risk Classifications Techniques 
 
The Property/Casualty industry has always used a very sophisticated Risk Classification 
system to attempt to provide a price to the policyholder that is truly commensurate with 
the risk that (s)he brings to the risk pool. 
 
In terms of underwriting the individual applicant for Auto insurance, commons risk 
classification parameters have included age, gender, driving record, driver training and 
territory (now often measured by postal code).  Some companies go further and offer 
differing prices based on personal variables such as “good student discounts”.   
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This sophisticated use of risk classification has now advanced to “Predictive Modeling”.  
 
Predictive modeling has been standard practice for P&C ratemaking in the U.K. for many 
years.  It has now gained widespread acceptance in the U.S. and Canada.  Predictive 
modeling involves using historical data on the policyholder available to the underwriter 
(often in the company records) to construct a model to help predict expected future 
claims (frequency/severity or both).   
 
Early predictive models were used for Auto insurance and the early entrepreneurs 
realized a measurable competitive advantage.  Others followed.  Predictive modeling is 
now also being used in Homeowners’ insurance and Commercial lines (Guven, 2006).   
 
Companies are using predictive models to identify new risk classification factors such as 
credit rating (credit scores).  P&C insurers have argued that the predictive power of credit 
scores is too strong to ignore.  Further, credit scores are readily available and easy to 
measure (Vass, 2004).  However, the authors are aware of resistance to the use of credit 
scores as an underwriting factor because of the impact on low-income individuals.  To 
the extent credit scores are correlated with income, insurers can merely use income as an 
underwriting criterion. 
 
Similar techniques are now being used by some companies to calculate better claims 
reserves estimates (although they are beyond the scope of this paper) and to better focus 
marketing strategies. 
 
In total, it appears that the Life Annuity actuaries may have a lot to learn from their 
colleagues in the U.K. and their colleagues in the P&C industry. 
 
V Antiselection in the Annuity Marketplace 
 
A person purchasing a life annuity in the current marketplace is one who expects to live a 
relative long life.  There are no economic incentives for substandard risks to buy 
annuities.  The life annuity insurer underwrites the life expectancy and has an actuarial 
gain in the event of an early death – the opposite of the result from a life insurance 
policy.  As a result, the interests of the company (making a profit through early death) 
and the interests of the annuitant (the desire for a long life and the financial benefit from 
receiving more annuity payments) are not aligned.   
 
Moving into the enhanced annuity market does not help align these interests.  However, it 
does level the playing field for poor risks and allow those individuals to enter the market 
and purchase an annuity reflecting their mortality risk.  As long as the annuity 
underwriting controls for buyer fraud and premium rates contain an adequate profit 
margin, the insurer will benefit by selling more annuity products than are currently being 
sold.  Similarly, the annuitant with substandard mortality will benefit by having access to 
an annuity market where prices more accurately reflect the risk being insured. 
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In order to control for a temporary change in one of the enhanced underwriting factors, 
annuity insurers could require factors to be present for a minimum amount of time.  For 
example, if a person has just been diagnosed with a medical risk, that factor would not be 
reflected in the annuity underwriting.  After the increased medical risk has been present 
for a reasonable period of time, which might vary among enhanced risk categories, the 
factor would be reflected in annuity underwriting. 
 
VI  Legal Constraints on Annuitant Risk Classification in the U.S. and Canada 
 
This paper has suggested that the Annuity industry adopt a more sophisticated Risk 
Classification system so as to provide a broader proportion of the population with Market 
Value Annuities.  It must be admitted, however, that there are legal impediments to the 
use of several of the proposed Risk Classification variables.  Because annuity 
underwriting currently is based on all applicants being in the lowest risk category, 
expanded underwriting criteria leading to the expectation of a shorter life span will result 
in cheaper annuity products.  As a result, the buying public and regulators may be more 
accepting of these expanded underwriting criteria.  In the U.S., insurance is regulated at 
the state level, complicating the use of new underwriting criteria. 
 
Underwriting criteria must be actuarially justified, requiring data for any new risk 
classification categories to show a category is the cause of or directly correlated with 
increased or decreased risk.   
 
Gender as an underwriting criterion for life insurance has been challenged.  It was 
successfully defended by showing strong statistical evidence that gender is linked to 
mortality and it is not merely a surrogate for any other factor.  While the use of gender is 
generally acceptable in the underwriting of “Life Contingent” products, there are two 
states in the U.S. (Montana and Massachusetts) which do not permit separate 
underwriting classifications based on gender.  Recently two Canadian provinces (Nova 
Scotia and New Brunswick) banned the use of gender in the underwriting and pricing of 
Automobile Liability insurance. 
 
The use of “Income” as a Risk Classification parameter may be challenged by groups 
who would argue that “Income” is just a proxy for race or ethnicity.  It is far from clear 
how these cases would be adjudicated, but the strength of underlying statistical data will 
have a significant impact of the outcome. 
 
We would predict that “Marital Status” would withstand a legal challenge because of 
available data supporting the link between marital status and mortality.  However, it 
could create political problems for the Annuity industry if members of the gay and 
lesbian community argued discrimination in states where same-sex unions are not 
recognized.  At this point, we have no data on the mortality profile of couples in long-
term same-sex marriages or unmarried heterosexual relationships.  However, many of the 
logical arguments to support the enhanced life expectancy of persons in marital pairings 
(enhanced social activities, stronger ties to community) would seem to apply equally as 
well to long-term same-sex or unmarried heterosexual pairings.  Because of the debate on   10
the definition of marriage in several U.S. states as well as in some Canadian provinces, it 
would be important to research the mortality impact of long-term relationships regardless 
of marital status.  If the impact is similar, insurers would avoid inconsistent definitions of 
marriage as the debate continues. 
 
Research is needed to determine whether long-term homosexual and long-term unmarried 
heterosexual relationships produce the same favorable results.  Long-term care policies in 
the U.S. give the same favorable risk classification to long-term homosexual relationships 
as heterosexual marriage because the partner is available to provide care and support in 
both types of relationships.  The authors do now know whether the same underwriting 
applies to unmarried heterosexual relationships. 
 
“Obesity” may fall into a similar categorization as “Marital Status”.  It would probably 
survive a legal challenge, but may create serious political backlash to the Annuity 
industry.  Studies of obesity as a mortality risk factor could look into whether genetics 
play a role in the link with mortality.  For example, is expected mortality different for 
those with or without the genetic predisposition to obesity?   
 
“Smoking” should be admissible because data already links mortality with smoking and 
life insurance policies use this underwriting criterion. 
 
 “Occupation” is not prohibited in the underwriting of life based contingencies.  The 
buying public would probably accept Risk Classification using “Occupation” if the 
“Occupation” was clearly dangerous or life threatening.  However, our data show that 
just having been in a blue-collar occupation over one’s lifetime is a predictor of shortened 
life expectancy in retirement.  Using blue-collar occupations as an underwriting criterion 
may create public debate even though it would result in more favorable annuity purchase 
rates for blue-collar occupations. 
 
We would expect the use of “Race and Ethnicity” and “Religion” to be prohibited as they 
are today for other life contingent products.  In fact, these underwriting categories would 
likely fail a constitutional challenge in the U.S. 
 
Other criteria likely to be supported by data include health conditions such as 
cardiovascular disease (e.g. high blood pressure or cholesterol) or a history of heart 
disease.  Risky vocations, like risky occupations, are likely to be shown to be a reliable 
risk classification, although the insured can change vocations and alter the risk and 
expected annuity payouts. 
 
The U.K. factor of “postal codes” should be expected to be challenged.  Certainly, it has 
been when used in the underwriting and pricing of Automobile insurance.  The argument 
will be made that “postal code” is just a proxy for Race and Ethnicity and thus should be 
prohibited.  At this stage, we would expect this to be a very difficult hurdle to clear in 
many jurisdictions. 
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The P&C factor of “Credit Scores” continues to be allowed in the product lines sold by 
P&C companies.  One would expect that to extend to Life contingent products as long as 
a sufficient causal link can be established between credit scores and mortality.  However, 
one might expect some backlash if it were viewed that “Credit Scores” were just a proxy 
for “Race and Ethnicity”. 
 
Obviously, these are not all well-defined judgments at this time.  One would expect a 
certain level of controversy at the very least. 
 
In the U.S., there is a trend toward allowing lump sum distributions rather than having 
employer-sponsored retirement plans make distributions in the form of an annuity.   
Defined contribution plans can avoid the administrative burden of obtaining spousal 
consent prior to distributing benefits to married participants merely by paying the full 
benefit as a lump sum distribution.  From a revenue perspective, lump sum distributions 
are front-loaded for tax purposes because the tax is payable at the time of the distribution 
rather than spread over time, giving Congress an incentive to permit lump sums. 
 
VII  Role of the Actuarial Profession 
 
Lump sums shift the longevity risk to the individual, who is often unaware of the risk and 
unable to adequately evaluate it.  The actuarial profession has the skills to assist in this 
risk evaluation. 
 
Actuaries can help individuals assess the most effective annuity purchase for their 
situation.  For example, wealth relative to living expenses is an important factor in the 
individual’s ability to self-insure the longevity risk.  Determining the optimal time to 
annuitize can be daunting, but actuaries have the professional training to assist with this 
evaluation. 
 
In order to facilitate more accurate pricing of annuities, actuaries can play a significant 
role in assembling the necessary data to support various underwriting categories.  This 
data will help both regulators and insurers determine appropriate underwriting categories. 
 
Actuaries can also encourage insurers to venture into more precise underwriting of 
annuities to allow more accurate pricing of these products.  Actuarial studies can 
establish the fairness to both insurers and annuitants of using more accurate pricing and 
underwriting. 
 
If annuity markets expand, medical underwriting should become more common.  For 
larger annuities, perhaps insurers will be motivated to fund medical exams to assure 
accurate underwriting.  Of course, there is a tension between paying for a medical exam 
so the annuitant may be able to pay less for the coverage (rather than paying more as is 
the case with life insurance).  However, if individuals are able to submit a medical 
certificate of substandard mortality, the possibility of fraud increases. 
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VIII  Conclusion 
 
It is the thesis of this paper that the U.S. and Canadian Life Annuity industry needs to 
work harder to provide “market value” annuities to all applicants, not just those who are 
in good health.  If this does not happen, then it is the belief of the authors that consumers 
will argue loudly enough about the unfairness of the private sector pricing to cause the 
government to consider intervention in one form or another.  Of course, it is possible that 
consumers will continue to avoid the annuity marketplace and forego the opportunity to 
purchase longevity insurance. 
 
Providing a more-complete pricing structure through more sophisticated risk 
classification is not without potential negative side effects, however.  One side impact 
that more-refined risk classification could cause in the annuity marketplace is increased 
prices and/or decreased annuity income for those who are truly healthy risks.  This is 
because, to the extent that the risk classification is successful, poorer risks who are 
currently in the annuity market will no longer be in the “Standard” class and their 
removal will also remove the subsidy they create in the risk pool when they die early.  
However, it may be the case that only the best mortality risks are currently in the annuity 
market, and enhanced underwriting will have no effect on them. 
 
One would expect the same side effect, however, if those in poor health cannot get a “fair 
value” annuity and just self-fund their retirement. 
 
Still, annuities provide the only means of guaranteeing that one’s capital will not be 
exhausted in retirement, no matter how long one lives. 
 
This is an extremely important point.  Planning one’s post-retirement income strategy 
without the benefit of pooling the “longevity” risk is very difficult.  Either you accept less 
than the optimum income through your retirement lifetime or you run a significant risk of 
running out of money altogether. 
 
This is even more true for those who can qualify for “enhanced” annuities since they 
offer a better income return with no downside in terms of longevity risk. 
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